scarcely any ideas are more central to organizational theory than the notion that with time and experience organizations improve their existing capabilities.

scarcely any ideas are more central to organizational theory than the notion that with time and experience organizations improve their existing capabilities. Theories ranging from those of March and colleagues (eg Cyert and March, 1992; March and Simon, 1993) to population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and punctuated equilibrium (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) quietness on the premise that learning from doing and imitation enable organizations to improve the execution of their core tasks and processe Studies point out to that organizations often experience sustained periods of improvement driven from both learning by doing and knowledge transferred from others (Argote, 1999) notwithstanding a closer look suggests that the processe in consequence of which organizations achieve internally focused change are more complexus and problematic than the literature recommends Recent studies on total quality management (TQM) for example, have institute that firms with serious TQM programs outperform their competitors (Hendricks and Singhal, 1996; Easton and Jarr ell 1998) however most efforts to implement TQM fail. Easton and Jarrell (1998) plant fewer than 10 percent of the Fortune 1000 had well-developed TQM programs, and Rigby (2001) reported that between 1993 and 1999 TQM level from the third most commonly used business tool to 14th in the U TQM's efficacy is undeniable, yet paradoxically, it remains little used.

The phenomenon of useful innovations that journey unused is not limited to TQM For example, although the utility of various human resource practices has been carefully documented (Pfeffer 1998) Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) reported that they remain infrequently busyed Similarly, Wheelwright and Clark (1995) lamented the poor implementation record of best practices for performance development. The inability of many organizations to use the knowledge embodied in administrative innovations like TQM and high-performance human resource and consequence development practices is a central issue facing organizational theorists (Pfeffer 1997: 202-203)

The failure of organizations to capitalize upon the opportunities presented by TQM and other administrative innovations is also single manifestation of a broader challenge facing organization theory. While firms oftentimes experience extended periods of improvement, learning rates vary significantly the couple within and across firms (Argote, 1999); existing theory moves little to explain why. Without an operational understanding of for what cause [i]or[/i] reason learning rates differ, theories built in succession the assumption that organizations make regular gains in existing capabilities pause on shaky ground.

granting the reasons organizations succeed or fail to implement administrative advances remain unclear, the literature furnishs at least three threads from which theory can be woven First are the prescriptive writings of the creators of improvement techniques (eg Crosby 1979; Ishikawa, 1985; Deming, 1986; Juran, 1995) TQM is important in this reverence because it provides both technical tools (eg statistical proces control) and behavioral and organizational behests (e.g., Deming's Fourteen Points). These prescriptive writings do not, however, contain underlying theory detailing for what purpose these practices are necessary or to what extent results might differ if they are not followed. A inferior strand, scholarly analyses of TQM helps fill this void. Hackman and Wageman (1995) identified a number of gaps between TQM practice and organizational and psychological theory, and since then, TQM has been interpreted from a variety of perspectives, including sociology (Zbaracki, 1998) institutional theory (Westphal, Gulati, and Shor mention one by one 1997), strategic management (Powell, 1995) economics (Wruck and Jensen 1994; Repenning, 2000) contingency theory (Sitkin, Sutcliffe, and Schroeder 1994) and sensemaking (Weick, 2000) granting these studies have added to our understanding of programs like TOM, frequently remains unexplained. The situation is similar for other innovations (Klein and Sorra, 1996; Pfeffer 1997) Finally, there is the growing literature onward the more general processes of technology implementation. Following Giddens (1984) these studies highlight the recursive relationships and mutual causal links among technology, institutional constructions beliefs, and behavior (e.g., Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, 1992) Similarly, late field studies explicitly considering feedback confirm the complexity of the dynamics that issue from efforts to implement improvement techniques (Sterman, Repenning, and Kofman, 1997; Keating and Oliva, 2000; Repenning, 2002)

Taken together, these three strands recommend both that such techniques do work and that, despite their documented benefits, we should not be surprised that efforts to implement so innovations sometimes fail--new technologies repeatedly produce distinctly different outcomes when introduced into different connected thought [i]or[/i] thoughtss (e.g., Barley, 1986). Despite these contributions, however, the paradox pos from useful but unused innovations remains. The forms processes, and feedbacks that influence whether an organization learns or stagnates, whether a promising improvement program is adopted or declineed remain largely unknown.