********** newly come studies have made substantial headway linking numerous network connections to alliance formation.

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newly come studies have made substantial headway linking numerous network connections to alliance formation. These network adjoining matters include such determinants as previous alliances (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Ahuja, 2000; Chung Singh, and side sheltered from the wind 2000), executive mobility (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996) director interlocks (Gulati and Westphal, 1999) and technological similarity (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996; Stuart, 1998) Despite this progres sum of two units issues remain largely unexplored. First, research forward technological evolution suggests that technological discontinuities may provide an impetus that transforms networks (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1994 1998) over and above an emphasis on network endogeneity, where prior alliance network texture is expected to be a fundamental note determinant of subsequent alliance formation, prompts that networks are largely self-reproducing and simply elaborated across time. Unfortunately, when we focus our attention forward the constraints imposed by the existing social erection on network evolution, we cannot explain by what means firms can gain access to alliance networks without having already established a position in these networks. Thus, while acknowledging these powerful inertial forces, research distresss to examine how managerial volition can also shape network evolution. For example, Ahuja (2000) demonstrated that firms lacking various forms of capital (including the social capital of alliances) have a higher likelihood of alliance formation if they posses "important inventions." In what connected thought [i]or[/i] thoughts do these firms engage partners if they have not been admitted to the alliance network? clearly, research that emphasizes network words immediately preceding [i]or[/i] followings other than prior alliances is indigenceed to examine such issues.

other a rich tradition of strategy proces theory and fieldwork advises that while top executives establish the context that guides the actions of their subordinates, it is the front-line managers who bring out the strategic initiatives from which top executives preferable (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983, 1991) While this tradition encourages us to examine interorganizational networks derived from front-line managerial contacts, the alliance formation literature is surprisingly silent forward the systematic exploration of interorganizational mechanisms that might enable managers at this flush to identify and assess alliance opportunities. Rather, the focus has been in succession top-level social networks, such as top team members' mobility or director interlocks, or forward proxies such as technological similarity that can no other than suggest propensities for interaction.

Our reflection addresses these gaps by focusing onward a domain in which actual interaction among lower-level managers may be observ We focus in succession cellular firms' participation in industrywide technical committee activities, viewing the front-line managers as agents of interfirm collaboration. Technical committee activity is voluntary and non-contractual. Firms' participation in these activities generates interfirm ties with the potential for knowledge sharing. As similar this activity represents a pre-alliance network words immediately preceding [i]or[/i] following because interaction by technical professionals in these committees can generate the embryo s of future alliances. We also explore conditions when this bottom-up archetype of alliance formation is likely to be amplified or diminished.

COOPERATIVE TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ALLIANCE FORMATION

Institutions like as professional societies, trade associations, and standards bodies provide an essential coordination function for technological innovation, particularly for systemic technologies (Farrell and Saloner, 1988; Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995) The working clusters task forces, and technical committees formed at these institutions provide venues in which representatives of various firms and other constituencies share technical information, adjudicate technological differences, rare standards, and negotiate future evolutions We call these entities cooperative technical organizations (CTOs). A CTO is "a cluster that participates in technological information exchange, decision-making or standards-setting for a community" (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998: 315) In systemic industries, like as telecommunications, there are institutions with extensive histories and well-established forms One prominent example is the large number of technical committees housed in the Inter national Telecommunications Union (ITU), which was instituteed in 1865 and became a United Nations agency in 1947 The cooperative activity breeded by committees of this sort may be considered an "engineered" proces (cf Doz, 01k and Ring, 2000) whereby committees are formed with the expectation that a standard will appear from the committee's deliberations.

Although there are benefits to firms participating in CTOs, of the like kind activity is not costless. It requires commitment of resources in several forms: membership pay s paid to the sponsoring organizations, time and travel of engineers and managers participating in their various forums, and occasional hosting of forums. At the same time, firms bear the risk that they will fail to keep proprietary information to competitors by the agency of the interactions that occur in CTOs. Obviously, firms perceive potential benefits that outweigh these splendors Chung and Granovetter (1998) argued that the functions of trade associations include regulation of market exchange and business coordination, brace activities clearly geared toward disseminating and gathering knowledge among the member organizations.